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Abstract 
 Thanks to the effort of two local educational authorities, in two regions of North 
Italy (Valle d’Aosta and the autonomous province of Trento) the PISA 2009 test was 
re-administered to the same students one year later. This paper is the first to analyse in 
the OECD-PISA context the potential advantages of re-testing the same students in 
order to provide better measures of schools’ contributions to student achievement. We 
show that while cross-sectional measures of school value added based on PISA 
student literacy, which measures “knowledge for life”, tend to be very volatile over 
time whenever there is a high year-to-year attrition in the student population, 
longitudinal measures of school value added are very robust to student attrition (even 
without controlling for sample selection). Moreover, persistence in individual test 
scores tends to be higher in highly “selective” (i.e. high drop-out) school 
environments. [JEL. I21 J24] 
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1 Introduction 
Researchers, policy makers and the general public are often interested in the contribution that 
schools give to an individual’s stock of knowledge, the so called school value added (VA, 
hereafter). The availability of “good” measures of school VA raises schools’ accountability, helps 
parents to choose better schools for their children and policy makers to allocate resources in an 
efficient and effective way. The general consensus is that building a proper measure of school VA 
requires longitudinal data, which allow measuring the increase in knowledge for the same individual 
overtime, some of which may be attributed to the school he or she attended. 
Some countries, such as the UK, have a long tradition in the construction of measures of school VA 
and already produce schools’ league tables on a yearly basis. Other countries have only recently 
started to build up a national system of school evaluation. This is the case of Italy, among others. In 
these countries, the results of the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
represent an important moment of confrontation with countries at a similar degree of development. 
Although PISA was not primarily thought for an evaluation of single schools but to test students’ 
competences, and in spite of its cross-sectional nature, governments regularly use PISA’s results as a 
means to evaluate the performance of their educational systems in a comparative perspective. There 
are some striking examples of this. Wide reforms of national educational systems were implemented 
following publication of PISA results in Germany and to a lesser extent in Switzerland. More and 
more countries were hit by the ‘PISA shock’ (Pons, 2011). Comparisons are regularly made both 
across countries and regions (e.g. North vs. South in Italy), and for the same country or region 
overtime, sometimes attributing improvements in PISA test scores to specific public interventions 
made in the school system.  
The main contribution of our paper, in an already vast literature, is that of discussing the issue of 
building school VA indicators using the PISA tests. This is likely to be important as many countries 
do not use standardized tests or do not have a national system of evaluating educational institutions, 
and for them PISA data will probably remain for long the only instrument to assess the effectiveness 
of their schools. We think that our contribution is also important as it investigates the role played by 
schools on the accumulation of “knowledge for life” as measured by PISA tests, which represents a 
concept of knowledge which is not necessarily curricular and which is assumed to be persistent over 
an individual’s life cycle. This is probably closer than curricular competences to the economic 
concept of “human capital”, which represents the stock of knowledge embodied in the individual 
and which will contribute to increasing her productivity or quality of life (health, political 
participation, etc.).1 
Thanks to two experiments made in two Northern Italian regions, the same PISA tests were re-
administered in 2010 to the same students who were included in the 2009 official testing survey. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to use data on a PISA retest, and gives us the 
opportunity to investigate some important issues. First, the re-tests were implemented in two 
Northern Italian regions, Trento and Valle d’Aosta, located in the North-East and North-West of 
Italy, respectively. The two regions share many common features, such as the fact of enjoying a very 
large autonomy from the central government and of being close to the foreign borders. However, the 
re-test was implemented on a voluntary basis in Trento while the entire student population was 
covered in Valle d’Aosta. This enables us to discuss the issue of panel attrition in two very different 
survey’s contexts, and its relevance when the objective is to build longitudinal measures of school 
value added. Second, the re-test exercise is useful to contrast cross-sectional measures of school VA, 
which are commonly available, with longitudinal measures. 
                                                 
1 Curricular competences may instead be year or age specific, i.e. it may be subject to very high rate of depreciation 
(students forget some concepts), and may not represent an optimal measure to evaluate the “social role”of schools. 
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Despite the high similarity between the two regions where the retests were implemented, our 
analysis uncovers very marked differences in the two “educational systems”. First, the correlation 
between the cross-sectional measures of school VA (i.e. the school fixed effects computed from 
cross-section data) in 2009 and 2010 is as high as 0.92 in Trento and is close to zero in Valle 
d’Aosta. Second, when we use longitudinal models of school VA, in which VA is measured by 
school fixed effects after including lagged values of student test scores in educational performance 
equations, we find that its coefficient is much higher for Valle d’Aosta than for Trento.  
We propose an explanation of these two empirical facts which is rooted into the different selectivity 
of the two educational systems. Indeed, while in Trento only 8% of the students who were originally 
tested in 2009 dropped out or changed school in 2010, the percentage rises to about 21% in Valle 
d’Aosta. Through a simple economic framework in which an individual’s school performance 
depends positively on the ability of her peers and negatively on the heterogeneity of the peer group, 
we account for higher “selectivity” (defined as a higher number of students dropping out or 
changing schools) being a likely determinant of both the lower correlation between cross-sectional 
measures of school VA measures and the higher year-to-year persistence in student test scores. 
Our analysis also shows that longitudinal measures of school VA, based on panel data, are little 
sensitive to student attrition, i.e. to the fact that some students who participated in PISA 2009 for 
various reasons did not participate in the 2010 re-test exercise, and this holds for the two regions. 
This stresses the importance of using longitudinal measures of school VA which, unlike cross-
sectional measures, are very robust to changes of the student intake, and therefore to the potentially 
different student selection and retention policies used by schools and educational systems. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the two experiments, which are 
to be considered as case studies, in the Italian context. Section 3 describes the main features of the 
two PISA retest experiments. Econometrics models of school VA are discussed in Section 4, which 
provides the econometric and theoretical background for our empirical analysis. In Section 5 we 
examine the potential sources of selection bias in our analysis, and make an attempt to address them. 
The main results of our analysis are reported in Section 6 and interpreted in Section 7. Section 8 
summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
 
2  Data and context 
Italy has always participated to the PISA survey since its inception in 2000. Initially lacking a 
national system of school assessment, the PISA survey became the first source of information on the 
performance of the Italian secondary school system, showing significant between-region and 
between-school variations (Bratti et al. 2007).2 Table 1 shows that students’ performance varies 
along two dimensions: the type of track attended and the North-South latitude. Looking at country 
level, the average distance between an academic oriented high school (liceo) and a vocational school 
(istituto or scuola professionale) is close to one and half standard deviation.3 In addition, the 
geographic divide is also quite impressive: other things constant, the North-East part of the country 
obtains the highest average test score, closely followed by the North-West macro-region. Centre and 
South-Islands then follow, with a gap well above half standard deviation. 
In the sequel of the paper we will focus onto two Northern regions which have conducted two re-
tests of students for research purposes: Trento and Valle d’Aosta (see Figure 1). The Autonomous 
Province of Trento is a small region of half million inhabitants, located in the North-East part of 
                                                 
2 This explains why the Italian sample size largely exceeds the standard country size, for many regional governments 
have relied on PISA results to assess local schools.  
3 In the international sample PISA scores have a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. 
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Italy, close to the Austrian border. Valle d’Aosta is even smaller a region in terms of population 
(128,000 inhabitants), located in the North-West of the country, for centuries under the rule of the 
French origin royal family Savoy, which one century and half ago succeeded in unifying the Italian 
nation. As other bordering regions (like Friuli Venezia Giulia), due to political reasons related to the 
difficult process of country unification both regions enjoy greater autonomy in administration (like 
school design) and revenue collection (not participating to the cross-region redistribution). 
Nevertheless both follow the Italian scheme of a tracked secondary school system, even if their 
regional-based vocational tracks enjoy better standards, as in the German tradition. When looking at 
student achievements through the PISA lens (see again Table 1) we observe that students from 
Trento’s or Valle d’Aosta’s schools obtain results that are in line with the bordering macro-regions, 
at a higher level than the centre-southern regions. This is mostly attributable to the relative 
performance of state vocational schools, which score almost half of a standard deviation above than 
schools of the same type in the rest of the country. In addition to macro-inequalities, and despite the 
existence of tracks which attract different types of students, there is also significant between-school 
variation.  
Before going into the analysis of school quality, the differences across regions and across school 
tracks raise questions about the student allocation across tracks. When we look at the variance 
decomposition (Table 2), we notice that the between-track variance is higher in Trento compared to 
the rest of the country, while it is lower in the case of Valle d’Aosta. On the contrary, there are no 
significant differences across areas when considering the between-school variance. This suggests 
that the choice of school track plays a more significant role in shaping students’ capabilities in 
Trento than in Valle d’Aosta, whereas variation in school quality seems rather similar across the two 
regions. The literature points to family background as one of the main factors driving students into 
different tracks. Without resorting to multivariate analysis, simple descriptive statistics (Table 3) 
suggest that sorting by social background may be less pronounced in Trento vis a vis the rest of the 
country.4 While in the rest of Italy students from better backgrounds (higher social prestige 
associated to parental occupation, better parental education as measured by years of education and 
better score)5 are gathered by high schools, then by technical schools and eventually by vocational 
schools, in Trento this process is less pronounced, and students in vocational schools seem better 
endowed with parental resources (at least vis a vis students in technical schools). What is common to 
the whole country is that regional vocational schools (which are characterised by shorter duration) 
attract students from poorer backgrounds.  
Trento and Valle d’Aosta, being small and rich regions, empowered with legislative autonomy, are 
hardly representative of the entire country. However they do represent two interesting case studies, 
which are sufficiently dissimilar among them to highlight different methodological problems 
connected to the measurement of school VA using longitudinal data. 
 
3  Description of the PISA retests 
In the year 2009 a decision to retest PISA students was independently taken by local educational 
authorities, following the advice of the local supervisory committees. In the case of Trento the 
opportunity was given by an effort at data collection, needed by the compilation of a biannual report 
on the state of Trento’s schooling system. In the case of Valle d’Aosta the occasion came from the 
                                                 
4 A more rigorous statistical analysis (ordered probit model) does not identify a precise pattern of sorting across 
regions, probably due to the lack of a proper measure of student ability. 
5 ECSC stands for index of Economic, Social and Cultural status and is derived from the highest occupational status 
of parents, highest educational level of parents (in years of education), family wealth, cultural possessions and 
home educational resources. 
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debate on the benefits to student learning deriving from bilingual education (Italian and French). As 
easily conceivable, the two projects underwent different negotiations with local schools’ 
headmasters, the final outcome being different strategies of implementation which do not grant full 
comparability of the two exercises. The main differences are the student participation (sampled in 
Trento, universal in Valle d’Aosta), school participation (voluntary in Trento, mandatory in Valle 
d’Aosta), the test score measurement (performed by INVALSI, the Italian agency of school 
assessment, in Trento and by ACER6-PISA consortium in the case of Valle d’Aosta) and the 
language used for the test (only Italian for Trento, Italian or French for Valle d’Aosta). However, the 
testing strategy is identical, and this grants sufficient comparability of the estimates across the two 
exercises. 
3.1  Structure of the PISA test in 2009 and 2010 
Following discussions with the PISA’s headquarter and with the Italian national agency for school 
assessment (INVALSI), it was decided to resubmit in 2010 the same PISA booklets already used in 
2009 for two main reasons. First, questions are not related to academic curricula set by the Ministry 
of Education, but they are intended to measure “… students’ ability to complete tasks relating to real 
life, tapping a broad understanding of key concepts, rather than limiting the assessment to subject-
specific knowledge” (OECD 2010, p.24). As a consequence, administering the test a second time 
does not prevent checking for improvements in pupils’ literacy levels. Second, the test is available in 
13 different versions of an equivalent level of difficulty (booklets) and it has, therefore, been 
possible for each participant to minimize the number of identical questions between the two test 
sessions. In fact, each student has been assigned a booklet in 2009 and one in 2010, according to the 
scheme described in Table 4. Each booklet consists of four sections and each section is identified by 
a type (M = mathematics, S = sciences and R = reading) and an index. There are, therefore, three 
different sections for mathematics (M1, M2 and M3) and sciences (S1, S2, S3) and seven different 
sections for reading (R1, ..., R7). It has to be noted that the redistribution of the booklets was such 
that each student answered in 2010 some questions that had already been responding in 2009. This 
overlap occurs for all students, but only for a quarter of the questions, which is a single section of 
the test (grey cells in Table 4 show the overlapping section). For example, all students who had 
received the booklet 1 in 2009 were assigned the booklet 7 in 2010, and the section M3 is common 
to both years. 
The students then had to answer several questions, three quarters different and one quarter identical 
between sessions; the test is biased towards the assessment of reading skills, since the PISA test in 
2009 (and therefore also 2010 re-test) is focused on students’ comprehension of written texts, 
although half of the booklet concerns competences in science and mathematics. In both events the 
student, the school and the parent questionnaires were not administered a second time, on the 
presumption that most of these information would have not changed over one year.  
 
3.2  Participating schools and test administration in Trento 
During the winter 2009 all 49 secondary schools in the Trento province whose pupils had taken 
the test PISA 2009 were contacted and asked to resubmit an equivalent test to the same students, and 
only 35 agreed to a second administration of the test.7 We will discuss in section 5.1 the potential 
selection bias due to schools’ or students’ non participation to the 2010 re-test. Whenever possible, 
for each school the reference person who had been responsible for testing in 2009 was contacted 
again in 2010. After meeting all reference persons to illustrate the potential test administration 
                                                 
6 ACER stands for Australian Council for Educational Research. 
7 As our main focus is on VA estimation for upper secondary schools, we dropped from the analysis one lower 
secondary school which was sampled in PISA 2009. 
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problems8 (April 16th, 2010), in May 2010, the booklets and the lists containing the identification 
codes of the students were transmitted from INVALSI to the local agency (Istituto Provinciale per 
la Ricerca e la Sperimentazione Educativa, IPRASE). Schools were given a window of two weeks 
for administering the test. The schools were required to return to IPRASE the booklets compiled 
within 48 hours from completion of the retest. In June, the tests were sent back from IPRASE to 
INVALSI which carried out the correction and scoring. INVALSI was constantly present in each 
stage of the retest exercise, providing the technical assistance for test administration, correcting of 
open questions and estimation of student scores (including the plausible values).9 
 
3.3  Participating schools and test administration in Valle d’Aosta 
Following a request from the local educational authority for evaluating the impact of bilingual 
education (Italian and French) onto student learning, an agreement was signed with the OECD-PISA 
consortium in order to administer the French version of the questionnaire to a random sample of 
students from Valle d’Aosta’s secondary schools. In order not to alter the standard national 
assessment conducted in 2009, it was decided to retest Valle d’Aosta’s students in 2010 using an 
identical scheme of booklet rotation described above (see again Table 4). Given the small size of 
each age cohort, all 15-year-old students enrolled in regional secondary schools (including private 
ones) were tested in 2009 (universal coverage). The very same students who were still enrolled in 
one of the regional secondary schools were retested on the same day (April 13th, 2010) one year 
later, but half of them (randomly determined at school level) obtained a booklet in Italian and the 
other half got it in French (the language spoken in the bordering region, even if the local variant – 
patois valdôtain – has dialectal inflexions).10 In this way it became possible to test both the potential 
increase in competences (confronting test scores in Italian over the two years) as well as the 
advantage/disadvantage in using Italian or French while tested. The tests were then mailed directly 
to ACER which returned the plausible values computed according to the international scale.    
The universal coverage of the 2009 survey highlights a different aspect of attrition in longitudinal 
studies. Looking at the numbers reported in table 5, we observe that 879 students took the test in 
2009, but only 736 were traced in the following year, losing 16% of the initial student body.11 
Among the 143 lost students, 75 are officially reported as absent/truant the day of the 2010 test, 16 
are unmatched among the two samples and the remaining 52 are truly drop-outs (since compulsory 
education ends at the age of 15) or movers outside the region. Within the 736 students included in 
the longitudinal component, only 696 persisted in the same track, while 40 (equivalent to 4.5% of 
the initial body) changed school track within the local schooling system.12 In order to evaluate the 
                                                 
8 In the meeting some doubts emerged about absent pupils. In the case of pupils who were absent on the day of the 
retest, they were not given the opportunity to be tested in a second session. However schools were asked to report 
the reasons of the student’s absence from school: transfer to another school, authorisation denied by parents, school 
drop-out, or a ‘standard’ truancy. Schools were instead requested to administer the tests to the students who were 
sampled for PISA 2009 but were absent during the test day, and who were present in 2010. Teachers in charge of 
the test administration were required of trying to replicate in 2010 the same testing conditions existing in 2009 
(duration, rules of conduct, rooms’ characteristics, time of the day). The main goal was to make the two testing 
exercises as similar as possible in order to minimise the incidence of framing problems. 
9 Starting from original students’ answers to tests, INVALSI estimated the plausible values in the Trento 2009 
sample provided by ACER-OECD, and then used the same algorithm to impute the 2010 plausible values. 
Technical details on the estimation procedure are reported in Di Chiacchio et al. (2010). 
10 Details can be found in Assessorato Istruzione e Cultura della Regione autonoma Valle d’Aosta Dipartimento 
Sovraintendenza agli Studi - Ufficio Supporto Autonomia Scolastica (2012) LA MAITRISE DE LA LANGUE 
FRANCAISE Rapport Régional PISA 2010 - Edition pour la Vallée d’Aoste. 
11 ACER-OECD released a file containing 752 observations appearing in both surveys, and we matched them to the 
public file of PISA 2009 survey using the test results. We were able to match 736 students, thus losing 16 
additional students which are reported in Table 5 as outside the local schooling system.  
12 Table 5 shows only track changes (40 students), but confronting the school code over the two years allows for the 
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school VA, we have to rely on this permanent component only, while accounting for the potential 
bias due to these different sources of attrition. 
 
4  Econometric models of school value added and the advantage of 
repeated student observations 
Various definitions of school VA exist in the academic literature. In general, school VA can be 
defined as the contribution that schools give to students’ competences over and above contextual 
factors. A good school VA model should take into account the characteristics of the student intake, 
which are likely to affect students’ competences irrespective of the schools they are enrolled in. 
Educational VA can be evaluated at different levels of aggregation. One can be interested in the 
school’s VA or in teachers’ VA, as in Rothstein (2009). In this latter case in order to distinguish the 
effect of teachers from that of the peer group it is necessary to have information on different classes 
within the same school, which is not the case of OECD-PISA. 
In the background of the exercises discussed in this paper there are two important assumptions. 
The first one is that PISA tests, which measure ‘competences for life’ and not curricular 
competences, can be a useful mean to evaluate schools. To put in other words, although performance 
in PISA tests may depend on a variety of factors, some internal and some others external to the 
schools (e.g., family and geographical contextual factors), the contribution given by a school to a 
student’s ‘competences for life’ is an important dimension of the school’s social role, and as such 
can be a matter of school evaluation. The second assumption is that the administration to 16 years 
old students of tests which are built to test the knowledge of 15 years old students can still give 
useful information on the endowment of ‘competences for life’. In the light of the proposals of 
policy interventions to enhance the performance of low-performing educational systems which the 
OECD-PISA has provoked in many countries, and the fact that instruments aimed at measuring 
‘knowledge for life’ should be little sensitive to specific individuals’ ages (as they measure a kind of 
knowledge which is supposed to be quite persistent overtime), we view these two assumptions as 
tenable.  
An important reference for researchers aiming at estimating educational production functions 
(EPF) is Todd and Wolpin (2003) who discuss the problems posed by this difficult task. The authors 
carefully describe all the limitations of cross-sectional measures of school VA, and the extremely 
richness of the data needed to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of the inputs entering the EPF, 
which then allow for the (unbiased) calculation of school VA. Unfortunately, in most cases 
researchers have to work with much less rich data, and this is also our case. Todd and Wolpin 
however highlight how the availability of longitudinal data is the first step towards a better 
understanding of the process of knowledge production. 
We assume that the data generating process for student literacy ( ijtT ) can be expressed through 
the following EPF  .f : 
),,,( ijtijtitijt aVABfT   (1) 
where i , j  and t  are subscripts for individual, school and time respectively.13 ijtT  is the test score 
of student i  in school j  surveyed in year t , itB  are current family inputs. Time-invariant 
                                                                                                                                                                   
identification of 12 additional students who changed school within the same track (and which are consequently 
excluded from the panel component). 
13 Here we do not follow a “cumulative approach” for knowledge production, that is we do not let past literacy enter 
the current production of literacy. So doing we focus on the best-case scenario in which the availability of two 
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unobservable individual components (like innate ability, self-confidence) are represented by ia . The 
contribution of school j  (including the effect of teachers’ quality, motivation, school finances, etc.)  
to student i ’s performance at time t  is defined as the school valued added jtVA . ijt  captures the 
effect of time variant unobservables. 
As it is often customary in the EPF literature, we adopt a linear specification. For illustrative 
purposes, let us assume that the student performance equation is given by the following EPF: 
 ijtijjitijt atBtT  210 . (2) 
The contribution of school j  to student i  performance at time t  is captured by a fixed effect ( j  ) 
and by the interaction tj   (a school-specific age trend). ijt  is a white noise. Equation (2) shows 
that two potential measures of VA are available. In cross-sectional studies, the researcher will be 
able to estimate only j , while in longitudinal studies, i.e. when repeated observations on test scores 
are available, both the school fixed effect and the school-specific age trend could in principle be 
estimated. The specification also shows how in the absence of a measure of individual ability it is 
difficult to interpret j  as school value added, since it will also capture the effect of other time-
invariant attributes of the school. By contrast, tj   can be considered as a more correct measure of 
school VA as it refers to the improvement overtime in the literacy levels of the students enrolled in 
school j .  
Estimation of equation (2) with ordinary least squares (OLS) poses several problems. Indeed, 
individuals are unlikely to randomly self-sort across schools, causing a correlation between 
individual ability, which is unobservable and enters the error term, and school fixed effects and age-
specific trends. The estimates of all coefficients will then suffer from an omitted variables bias. 
Let us see now what are the advantages of having repeated observations on student performance. We 
start by lagging equation (2) one period to obtain 
 112101 )1()1(   ijtijjitijt atBtT  (3) 
from which we can easily derive an expression for individual ability 
    112101 11   ijtjjitijti tBtTa  (4) 
and replacing (4) in (2) we obtain 
   11211   ijtijtjititijtijt BBTT . (5) 
Equation (5) clearly shows that past performance 1ijtT  acts as a sufficient statistics for individual 
unobserved ability. In this case, under the assumption that  1 ijtijt  is uncorrelated with 
school VA consistent estimates of schools’ VA can be retrieved from the OLS estimates of the 
school fixed effects j . In addition, equation (5) will also allow for consistent estimation of the 
effect of family inputs 2  if the variation in family inputs  1 itit BBB  is uncorrelated with 
 . 
                                                                                                                                                                   
adjacent time observations ( ijtT  and 1ijtT ) of test scores (as in our case) can help the researcher to estimate the 
“true” EPF. This would not be possible if EPF had a cumulative form since 2ijtT  (which is not observed) will enter 
1ijtT . However, we will see in what follows that also in our specification past performance will enter current 
performance through the role of unobserved individual ability (see equation (5)). 
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Two things are worth noting. First, past performance enters equation (5) with a unitary coefficient. 
However, in the data we do not observe true knowledge but an imperfect measure of it, namely 
Tijtijt mTT  *  where Tm  is the measurement error in the true literacy score 
*T . Classical 
measurement error (e.g., Tm  could be considered as pure luck), for instance, in the absence of other 
regressors in (5) will lead to an attenuation bias and the estimated coefficient on 1ijtT  will be less 
than one. With other covariates, the sign and magnitude of the bias will depend on the correlation 
between 1ijtT  and the other explanatory variables. Second, unfortunately, as we said both for the 
Trento province and for Valle d’Aosta re-tests, the family questionnaires were not re-administered 
one year later, and therefore we only have one measure of  family background ( 1itB ). When the two 
observations of test scores are close enough in time, the assumption that  0B , i.e. no variation in 
family background, can be considered quite innocuous. In this case the EPF becomes   
 111   ijtijtjijtijt TT . (6) 
However, if this is not the case, including only past family inputs would lead to the specification  
  121211   ijtijtitjitijtijt BBTT   (7) 
where the sum in brackets represents the new error term. Then it is clear that the estimate of the 
contribution of past family background will be biased if 02   or family background is serially 
correlated (as it is likely to be the case). As 1ijtT  also includes past family background, also the 
coefficient on past performance will be biased (under the same hypothesis of serial correlation). The 
estimates of the school fixed effects will be unbiased only under the assumption of no school 
selection according to current family background.14 Also this additional assumption is not too strong 
if the choice of the specific school has been made in the past like in the case of Italy (normally at 
age 14) according to persistent family characteristics (which are well proxied by 1itB ) while current 
changes in family background are unlikely to push individuals to change school. Summarizing, 
although equation (7) is the true data generating process for educational performance, as we noted, 
the  estimated coefficients on the indipendent variables may differ from their true values because of 
measurement error, the omission of current family background, and student self-selection into the 
different schools. 
 
5  Potential sample selection biases 
The two experiments conducted in Trento and Valle d’Aosta are potentially affected by sample 
selection biases. The bias is likely to be more severe in Trento, as participation to the 2010 re-test 
took place on a voluntary basis, than in Valle d’Aosta. However, there are potential sources of bias 
also for the latter even if all schools were sampled and participated in the re-test. In what follows we 
will examine what factors are associated with schools’ (for Trento) and students’ (for both 
experiments) participation in the 2010 re-tests. 
5.1  Trento 
As we have anticipated in Section 3, participation of schools to the Trento’s PISA 2010 retest took 
place on a voluntary basis. For this reason, the results of the retest exercise cannot be considered as 
                                                 
14 The inclusion of past performance in (7) will partly account for this selection, if family background is serially 
correlated. A comparison between the estimates of (6) and (7) can also suggest whether the assumption 0B  is 
credible, as in this case equations (6) and (7) should give very close estimates of the school fixed effects j . 
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representative of the 16-year-old population of Trento. What kind of bias can be expected from the 
schools’ self-selection into the re-test?  It could be plausible to think that the relatively better 
performing schools in PISA 2009 may have accepted to participate (positive selection) since they 
were expecting better results also in the 2010 retest (even if they were unaware of their placement 
when they took the decision). In this case, the 2010 retest may overestimate the competences of 
Trento’s students. However, such positive selection is less likely to have taken place in terms of VA 
– the specific contribution given by schools to the improvement of student competences, as schools 
may have only a very vague idea of their VA.15 
Among the 49 Trento’s upper secondary schools sampled in PISA 2009, 14 (29%) refused to 
participate to the 2010 follow-up. Among them, there are 4 high schools (licei), 4 technical schools, 
2 vocational state schools and 4 regional centres. Observing the school’s distribution, there is no 
clear evidence of positive selection, according to which we would have expected licei to participate 
more than other school types. In Table 6 we analyse the potential distortions produced on the EPF 
estimates by the sample selection. In column (1) we have reported a simple OLS estimation of the 
EPF for the initial year.16 Variables which are significantly associated with test scores are the 
attended grade, having attended kindergarten, books at home, highest parental occupation status, 
immigration status and school track, much in line with the previous literature. In column (2) we 
report the probit coefficients for the probability of schools’ participating in the retest. Owing to the 
small sample size (49 schools), we have specified a parsimonious model. Among the regressors only 
(school average) past kindergarten attendance, the (school average) number of books and the (school 
average) PISA 2009 test score are significantly associated to schools’ participation, respectively 
with positive (kindergarten and books) and negative (previous year score) signs. After controlling 
for past performance, school track is not a significant predictor of school participation. Past 
performance seems to contribute in a substantial way to the likelihood of schools participating in the 
retest, which falls by about 0.7 percent points for a one-point increase in the 2009 school’s average 
score. This means that schools which are one standard deviation (100 points) above the average 
performance would have a 70% lower probability of participating to the re-test. Curiously enough, 
this indicates negative rather than positive selection. A possible interpretation of this result is that 
some schools which performed relatively well in 2009 preferred not to participate because they were 
afraid of performing badly in 2010. 
However, our data may be subject to a second source of selection. Indeed, the schools which 
decided to participate may have adopted strategic behaviours by encouraging participation of abler 
students and discouraging that of least able students, so as to artificially inflate their measured 
performance.17 In any case, voluntary absences are likely to be higher among low-performing 
students, which will bias downward the PISA scores.18 There is also another source of panel 
attrition which may potentially bias our estimates: some students may have dropped-out from 
education or transferred to another school, and this is unlikely to be random with respect to their past 
performance. In particular, we expect least able students to have dropped-out or transferred to other 
schools, which may introduce an upward bias in the measured competences. Also in this case, like 
for schools’ participation to the retest, it is unlikely that the students’ self-selection took place based 
on the knowledge of the true school VA, consequently this potential source of positive bias should 
                                                 
15 In fact, for the US Rothstein (2009) shows evidence of non-random assignment of teachers to classes also in terms 
of potential competences’ improvements, i.e. of VA. 
16 In all the estimates from now onwards we take as measures of students’ performance the average between the five 
plausible values provided by the OECD or INVALSI. We are aware that using simple OLS estimates without 
replication weights leads to biased standard errors, but we could not find any reference in the literature on which 
strategy should be adopted when multiple plausible values exist both on the RHS and the LHS of the estimated 
equation (as in equation (6) for 1ijtT and ijtT )  
17 See Bratti et al. (2004) for a discussion on this in the context of Higher Education. 
18 Although the direction of the bias on school VA is less clear. 
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be only minor. The percentage of absences from the retest is 18.8%: 10.43% are ‘ordinary’ 
absences, 0.19% refer to children whose parents denied permission, 0.10% to children with ‘special 
conditions’ (e.g. disability), 8.04% to children who dropped out or transferred to another school. As 
it is clear, most part of absences represents ordinary student truancy, but as we said, randomness is 
unlikely also for these absences.  
In column (3) we report the probit estimates for a student’s probability to participate to the retest 
exercise, conditional on her school having participated. In this model, which is estimated at the 
student level, we can include a wider set of controls compared to column (2). We have included all 
controls already considered in the estimation of the EPF in column (1). Indeed, most of these 
controls may have a direct effect on absenteeism, e.g., highly educated parents may put more value 
to education and induce their children to reduced absenteeism, and have an indirect positive effect 
through past (or expected future) performance. The model in column (3) also includes the day of the 
week in which the test was administered by the school, as student truancy may be concentred 
especially in certain days of the week. This variable will be also useful in our later attempt to 
address student self-selection in the estimation of the EPF. The results in column (3) show that there 
is indeed a statistically significant positive association between PISA past performance and the 
likelihood of participating in the retest exercise, although the marginal effect is not very large: a 
one-standard deviation increase in the PISA score (100 points) raises the probability of participating 
by 3 percent points. Column (3) suggests that only past performance and the day of testing are 
strongly associated with student participation. Curiously enough, absenteeism does not appear to be 
related to family background after controlling for past performance. Absences turn out to be 
significantly more frequent on Wednesday (9.3 p.p.) and Saturday (10.5 p.p.), i.e. in the middle 
and at the end of the week. The Wald test for the exclusion of the day of the week from the probit 
model returns a value of 21.5 distributed as a  52 . 
Column (4) reports the estimates of the model reported in column (1) but only on the selected 
sample of students participating to the 2010 re-rest. A comparison between column (1) and (4) 
suggests only minor changes in the magnitude of the significant coefficients, indicating that attrition 
and selection in the re-test do not bias significantly the relevant coefficients. The statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the dummy for vocational schools is reduced, suggesting that 
vocational schools may have pushed only their better students to participate in the retest. 
Column (5) reports the model including the same regressors and estimated on the sample of students 
who participated in both PISA tests (the ‘panel component’) but considering the score in the PISA 
2010 reading test as the dependent variable. Here we note some non-negligible changes with respect 
to the previous column. In particular, the effect of the school grade almost halves, while that of state 
vocational schools double. In general regional vocational schools (the excluded case) lose grounds 
with respect to all the other school types. These effects are likely to be associated with the 
differential retention policies and drop-out in place in the different schools, and are consistent with 
regional vocational schools being the least selective (the difference in the average ability between 
regional vocational schools and the other school types tend to increase at higher grades).  
In column (6) we make an attempt to correct the EPF for student self-selection. In particular, we 
include the propensity score (PS), the probability of attending the 2010 re-test obtained from the 
probit model in column (3) (see Angrist 1997). The coefficient on the propensity score is not 
statically significant, and the coefficients associated with significant regressors do not change much 
with respect to column (5). The only exception is the variable for cultural capital (no. of books at 
home) which loses statistical significance. 
In column (7) and (8) we follow an alternative procedure to address the selectivity issue. We 
estimate a Heckman sample selection model where the EPF is reported in column (7) and the 
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selection equation in column (8). 19 The selection equation uses the same specification as in column 
(3). The results in column (7) are very similar to those in column (6). The estimated correlation 
between the error terms of the EPF and the selection equation turns out to be high in magnitude 
(0.886) and very significant (the standard error is 0.046), confirming again that only the relatively 
better performing students participated in the 2010 retest.20  
Summing up what we analysed so far, the analysis for Trento suggests that panel attrition may have 
produced a selected sample in terms of higher students’ ability and better potential performance in 
the PISA test, and that controlling for past performance becomes even more relevant because it may 
help reduce the distortions produced by self-selection into the test. 
 
5.2  Valle d’Aosta 
Unlike for the experiment conducted in Trento, the 22 schools of Valle d’Aosta were obliged to 
submit their entire student body to the PISA test in both years. However, grade 10 (which is the 
modal grade for 15-year-old students) concludes compulsory education in Italy, and a fraction of 
students abandoned their schools, while another fraction changed schools. As we have anticipated in 
section 3, school leavers and movers jointly consist of 21% of the student body, and we wonder how 
this may affect the estimate of schools’ VA. School leavers are likely to be weaker students, thus 
raising the average test performance of the remaining students. If track allocation of students is not 
random, school changers (mostly from academic oriented high school to technical and vocational 
schools) are likely to raise the performance of the abandoned schools as well as of the receiving 
schools.  
Following the same scheme used for the Trento experiment, Table 7 shows the potential distortions 
produced on the EPF estimates by the sample selection. In column (1) we have reported a simple 
OLS estimation of the EPF for the initial year (2009). This cross-section EPF is consistent with 
theoretical expectations (as well as with previous results for Trento): test score in literacy is 
positively correlated with grade (repeating students have a lower score, while anticipating ones do 
better), books at home (which is probably very correlated with parental years of education, which do 
not come out significant) and first-generation immigrant status, which is negatively associated to 
reading ability in the host country. School track, which is measured as difference against the low-
performing regional vocational schools, provides a statistically significant estimate of the positive 
premia in test scores associated to attending a high school (100 test points, equivalent to one 
standard deviation, and in line with the corresponding estimate obtained for Trento) or a technical 
school (72 test point); no difference is recorded between state-organised or region-organised 
vocational schools. These results are in line with the previous literature, suggesting that a large 
fraction of school differences is captured by student sorting into tracks.  
                                                 
19 The model was estimated in one step with maximum likelihood. 
20 Indeed, let us write the main performance equation as ijtijtijt XT   and the selection equation as 
ijtijtijt uZP   where ijtZ  is a vector of regressors including all covariates in the vector ijtX  and an excluded 
variable to identify the model, ijtP  is  an indicator variable which takes on value one in case of participation in the 
retest exercise and zero otherwise, and ijt  and ijtu  two normally distributed error terms, it can be shown that 
ijtijtijtijtijt ZXPTE  )()1|( , where    is the correlation coefficient between ijt  and ijtu  and   is the 
variance of  ijt . )(/)()(  ijtijtijt ZZZ  is the so called Inverse Mill’s (IMR) ratio, where (.)  and (.)  are 
the standard normal density and distribution functions (see Heckman, 1979). Thus the quantity on the denominator 
of the IMR is the propensity score, and  0  implies a positive dependence of test scores on the propensity score. 
This also explains the high correlation of the IMR with the PISA test score, which depends on the past score which 
is in turn very correlated with current performance. 
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In column (2) we report the probit coefficients for the probability of students remaining in the 
regional schooling system, irrespective of the school attended (724 over 839 students with non-
missing information), whereas column (3) restricts the same model to the students who remained in 
the same school (663 students21), thus controlling for both the probability of drop-out and moving 
downward in the school track. Both columns indicate that there is a positive selection into taking the 
test the following year, based on past performance, with the marginal effect in the former (0.0005 
probability points per one point in test score) being almost half of the impact measured in the latter 
(0.0009 probability points per one point in test score). However, looking at the coefficients of school 
tracks, we notice that most of the drop-out occurred in regional vocational schools, given the quite 
similar, positive and significant marginal effects that we find associated to the track attended. More 
surprising is that (leaving/moving) probability comes out independent from the same variable, 
suggesting that the downward mobility (from high to vocational schools) of students partially offsets 
the differential in dropping out (see the final two columns of table 5). Some evidence of a role of 
family resources is found in the negative correlation with parental occupational status, which 
however does not predict school change at a larger extent. Differently from the case of Trento, we 
cannot exploit additional information on test taking, like the week day of the test (all students were 
tested on the same day), which would help us to identify the effect of the propensity score whose 
identification will then depend on past performance score only.22 
Column (4) reports the estimates of the model reported in column (1), restricted to students who 
persisted in the same school. A comparison between column (1) and (4) indicates that there is 
limited selection bias in estimating the family’s impact, since the correlation with the number of 
books at home, wealth and migration status are statistically not different in the two models. 
Confidence intervals also overlap for dummies of school tracks, which also absorb most of the 
parental background’s effect. Interesting enough, the coefficient associated to grade attended (which 
captures the effect of school repeaters) declines, since part of the repeaters has either dropped-out or 
changed school. 
The PISA 2009 gradients estimated in column (4) are to be confronted with the PISA 2010 gradients 
estimated in column (5), where the sample is restricted to the students remaining in the same 
school.23 The EPF estimated in two adjacent years looks rather stable. However, as in the case of 
Trento, we observe an increase in the magnitude of the coefficients associated to the type of 
secondary school attended, consistently with the idea that remaining within a school for an 
additional year strengthens its impact. The difference between these coefficients may be taken as 
gross estimates of the VA associated to the school type: thus attending a high school in Valle 
d’Aosta was associated to 117 PISA points in reading when 15-year-old and 197 points one year 
later, yielding a measure of 80 points of VA. Similarly, we obtain 68 points for technical schools 
and 75 for state vocational schools, which are to be compared to the corresponding measures for 
Trento (see columns (4) and (5) in table 6): 21 points for high schools, 12 points for technical 
schools and 30 points for state vocational schools. These simple calculations highlight a crucial 
problem we are going to discuss in the sequel: all cross-sectional measures are conditional on a 
benchmark (the excluded case) and cannot be taken in their absolute value. The higher VA measures 
recorded in Valle d’Aosta are the likely reflection of a decline in the absolute results of regional 
                                                 
21 Let us remind the sample selection leading to the panel component in Valle d’Aosta (see section 3.3): from 879 
students taking the test in 2009, only 736 took the test in 2010, but 40 had changed track and 12 had changed 
schools within the same track. Thus the panel component consists of 684 students, which reuces to 663 because of 
missing information on some demographic variables. 
22 Indeed, since in Table 7 we do not adopt a longitudinal VA model (including past test score in the EPF), past test 
score can be used to identify the model. In longitudinal VA models, by contrast, identifiction will only rely on 
functional form. 
23 The file obtained from ACER-OECD also contains new 16-year-old entrants in 2010, which however were not 
made available to us due to lack of privacy consensus agreement. 
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vocational schools, especially when confronted with tests administered in French. If we observe the 
mean test scores reported in table 8 we notice an improvement in all school types but regional 
vocational schools when the test is administered in Italian, and a general worsening when the test is 
taken in French. This is partially controlled for by a dummy variable, which suggests a penalization 
of almost 60 points associated to the use of French, despite the strong emphasis on bilingual 
education in the region.  
The coefficients associated to family background and school type change when we account for 
sample self-selection, either by including the estimated probability of entering the permanent 
component of the sample (from column (3)) in column (6) or by adopting an Heckman selection 
model (columns (7) and (8)). In both cases, the identification relies on imposing the exclusion of 
2009 test score from the prediction of 2010 test score (i.e. adopting a cross-sectional specification). 
The magnitude of the coefficients associated to school types falls by approximately 20 points, 
indicating that part of the measured VA should be imputed to student self-sorting out of the same 
schools. The coefficient on the PS in column (7) is high and statistically significant, suggesting that 
increasing the probability of participating in the 2010 re-test by 10 percent points is associated with 
a 67-point increase in the PISA score. Surprisingly enough, the correlation coefficient between the 
error terms of the EPF and the selection equation in the Heckman’s selection model (column (8)) 
turns out to be almost identical in magnitude with the Trento’s experiment (0.885 with a standard 
error of 0.033). 
Summing up, previous results indicate that VA measurement in Valle d’Aosta’s schools is plagued 
by changes in sample composition, which make it very hard to obtain a reliable measure of the 
whole school/teacher contribution to the improvement of students’ test scores. In the sequel we do 
our best to obtain robust measures from the available data for the two regions. 
 
6  School value added estimation 
In this section, we report the estimates of the EPF for Trento and Valle d’Aosta. Given the limited 
number of students per school, we are forced to assume that the contribution given by school j  to 
its students’ literacy levels (VA) is the same for all students, i.e. the school has an intercept effect 
only.24 Table 9 shows the results for Trento. All regressions are estimated on the “panel component” 
so as to isolate the effect of using different specifications of the EPF from potential differences in 
the composition of the samples.25 In column (1) we have reported a simple specification which does 
not include school fixed effects (SFE, hereafter), using the test scores in 2009 as the dependent 
variable. The age and the grade of the student turn out to be positively associated with performance 
in the PISA test. The same happens for cultural capital (the number of books at home), and family 
socio-economic index (HISEI). Having attended kindergarten and being a first-generation immigrant 
are marginally significant, with a positive and a negative sign, respectively. In column (2) we 
include SFE. Except for the difference from the modal grade, the inclusion of SFE has the effect of 
reducing the coefficients of the other significant regressors. Cultural capital, HISEI and first-
generation immigrants all reduce in size. Column (3) estimates the same model of column (1) but 
using the 2010 test score as the dependent variable. The results in column (1) and (3) are 
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. The same is observed when comparing column (2) and 
                                                 
24 This assumption could be relaxed by including interaction terms between the school indicators and student 
characteristics but this is feasible only if a large number of students are sampled for each school. 
25 We should keep in mind that unless we adopt random effect models, we are forced to choose one excluded school, 
which then represent the benchmark case against which we compare the relative effectiveness of the remaining 
schools. In the present analysis, we have left out the final school (that with the highest code), which in both regions 
is a regional vocational school. 
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column (4), which both include SFE. The coefficients on grade, cultural capital and first-generation 
migrants tend to be slightly lower in 2010.  
Columns (1) to (4) estimate performance in levels, while column (5) specifies a ‘value added 
model’, including the test score in 2009 as an additional regressor for the test score in 2010. 
Notably, the only significant regressor turns out to be past test performance. Only the first-
generation immigrant indicator retains statistical significance, but only at the 10% level. The 
coefficient on the past test score is 0.304 (column (7) controlling for self-selection), well below the 
coefficient of one which emerges from the underlying model outlined in Section 4. As we mentioned 
earlier, this may be partly due to measurement error and the fact that test scores are likely to contain 
some noise, and not to perfectly measure ‘true knowledge’. In column (6) we have included only 
past performance among the regressors. Under the assumption that changes in student characteristics 
in two adjacent years are almost null, we should expect very similar estimates of the SFE from the 
models (5) and (6). The coefficients on past score in the two columns are not statistically different.  
Below the table we have reported the correlation and the rank correlation between the estimates of 
the SFE obtained with various models. We focus on the rank correlation, because ranking schools is 
often in the interest of educational policy-makers. First, when using specifications in levels, the 
rankings of SFE in 2009 and 2010 are highly correlated (0.88). When switching to a longitudinal 
value added model, the rank correlation is much more similar with respect to the specification in 
levels in 2010 than in 2009 (0.81 vs. 0.98), but is in both cases very high. All in all, these estimates 
suggest that if one focuses on the panel component of the dataset, that is on the students which 
participated in the two testing exercises, the specific model used to estimate SFE does not make a 
huge difference for the estimation of schools’ VA (in the meaning we adopted, i.e. school fixed 
effects). This however does not exclude that the estimates of the school VA may be influenced by 
the student self-selection in the 2010 re-test. For this reason in column (7) we have reported the 
results of the estimates controlling for the propensity score, i.e. the probability of having participated 
in both tests,26 and also the rank correlation with the SFE estimated with such model. As shown by 
column (7) of Table 9 the propensity score is not statistically significant, suggesting that the 
inclusion of past performance is sufficient to control for the potential self-selection of students 
according to past or prospective performance. Consistently, the rank correlation of the SFE of model 
(5) and (7) is almost one. Our analysis suggests therefore that controlling for past performance is 
likely to address all ability-related potential estimation bias generated by panel attrition.   
Yet we are unable to fully account for unobservable components related to students’ ability in 
measuring schools’ contribution to student test scores. If we net out these components by taking first 
differences in tests as our dependent variable and we estimate school fixed effects, we find limited 
correlation with previous measures of VAs (see the final row of the correlation matrix). Visual 
inspection of the alternative measure of school fixed effects (see figure 2) suggests that in the case 
of Trento school rankings are rather different when we consider single-year measures obtained from 
cross-sectional data (upper panels) but when we can use past performance as an additional control 
the problem of self-selection is minimised (left lower panel). However, if can get rid of individual 
student fixed effect, school rankings appear quite different (right lower panel).27 
When we repeat the exercise in the case of Valle d’Aosta (see Table 10) we find a similar 
attenuation of the coefficients pertaining individual characteristics when school fixed effects are 
included (columns (2) and (4)), confirming that students are (at least partially) sorted in schools 
according to individual characteristics. When we use past performance as a control (column (5)) we 
                                                 
26 For the specification of the PS we used the model in column (3) of Table 6. 
27 Since we use individual first difference in test score as our dependent variable to get rid of individual 
unobservables, we are imposing the restriction on the coefficient of 1ijtT  being equal to one, which is clearly 
rejected by our estimates. This explains the low correlation for school fixed effects computed under this strategy. 
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observe a much higher coefficient than what we obtain in the case of Trento (0.63 vs. 0.30)28 while 
many individual characteristics still retain statistical significance (gender, modal grade, parental 
education, availability of books and immigration status). Controlling for self-selection into the panel 
sample (column (7)) does not add much, given the absence of reliable exclusion restrictions. 
Eventually, when we restrict to the reduced form represented by equation (6) (see column (6)), while 
still controlling for the test language, we find that the AR(1) coefficient is still significantly different 
from 1 (test F=45.11 (0.00)) but much higher in magnitude than in the case of Trento.  
When we move to the rank correlation among the estimated measures of school VAs, we observe 
that single year cross-sectional measure are not even correlated; the correlation raises when we 
consider longitudinal measures, but it does not reach the higher value obtained in the case of 
Trento.29  
 
7  A suggested interpretation 
In this section, we propose a potential reading of our results, and in particular of the differences 
between the two regional retests. The main differences are summarised in Table 11. First, the 
correlation between the cross-sectional measures of school VA in 2009 and 2010 is very high in 
Trento (0.918) while it is close to zero in Valle d’Aosta (-0.0192). Second, the AR(1)30 coefficient in 
the PISA score is quite low in Trento (ranging from 0.26 and 0.30 - see Table 9) and much higher in 
Valle d’Aosta (between 0.63 and 0.78 - see Table 10). In what follows we propose a possible 
interpretation of these two empirical facts based on differential school selection (selectivity) in the 
two regions. Here, selectivity must be interpreted as dynamic selectivity.  More selective schools 
(educational systems) are those in which there is high number of school movers or drop-outs.31 
Let us assume that school literacy (or performance) at time t  (the PISA test score in our case) is a 
function of past year’s performance, individual ability, (peer) average ability and homogeneity in 
abilities of the group of her peers: 

jtSFE
jtjtiijtijt aaTT
2
1   . (8) 
where ijtT  stands for the PISA score of individual i  in school j  at time t , ia  is her level of ability 
(time-invariant by assumption), itjt aa   is the average ability of her peers (the individual i  ability 
is not considered when computing the mean), and 2jt  is their variance. School performance is 
assumed to depend positively on an individual’s past performance and ability, on the average level 
of ability of her peers, while it is negatively affected by school heterogeneity. The latter effect can 
be motivated by the difficulties of teaching to individuals with different levels of ability (i.e., a 
                                                 
28 The difference between the two regions disappears when we replace individual data with school averages: 0.99 
(s.e. 0.13) for Valle d’Aosta against 0.93 (0.06) for Trento, but these estimates are computed over 22 and 35 
observations respectively. 
29 What is more surprising is the higher correlation between the rankings obtained with and without controlling for 
individual student fixed effects (last row of the correlation matrix in table 10): while in the case of Trento the rank 
correlation between longitudinal SFE measures with and without control for unobservables was low, in the case of 
Valle d’Aosta it exceeds 0.70, suggesting that in the latter case these student components do not play any role. This 
can be visualised going to the bottom panel of figure 3, where we observe that school fixed effects tend to align on 
the 45-degree line. 
30 First order autoregressive coefficient. 
31 This is different from high selectivy at entry for instance in terms of student ability, which may produce the 
opposite result (i.e. low drop-out and school change rates). 
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teaching quality effect) or by class disruptive behaviour à la Lazear (2001).32 The third and fourth 
addends in equation (8) jointly determine the SFE for school j  at time t . In our analysis we are not 
able to disentangle the separate effects of the peer group and school quality, which are both captured 
by SFEs. 
Given this simple setting, we may wonder what would be the effect of school VA estimation of 
having two educational systems (of two different regions) with a very different degree of selectivity. 
We have already seen in Section 5.1 that in the case of Trento the rate of student (panel) attrition, in 
the school which did participate in the 2010 re-test, is around 20% (18.8%), but about 8%  are 
school drop-outs or school changers. In the case of Valle d’Aosta, from Table 5 the incidence of 
school drop-out and school changes is more than double, rising to about 22%. 
A higher selectivity (overtime) of the school system means that as time goes by, the school intake in 
terms of peer group’s quality will tend to change overtime. In terms of the specification of equation 
(8) we face two effects. First, in the high-selectivity system the estimates of school VA in two 
adjacent years, say t  and 1t , are likely to be less correlated than in the low-selectivity systems, 
where average ability and its variance tend to be more persistent overtime. This is consistent with 
the first empirical fact that cross-sectional measures of school VA show a higher correlation in 
Trento than in Valle d’Aosta. This however also poses some methodological issues, as cross-
sectional measures of VA for the same school can be very sensitive from year to year, and moreover 
do not ‘penalize’ schools for the potentially high number of drop-out or school changers. Actually, 
the SFE in (8) will rise overtime if a school does cream-skimming among its student body. Let us 
keep in mind now that in equation (8) 1ijtT  can in turn be expressed as  
),,( 2 111   jtjtiijt aafT . (9) 
Thus, in less selective school environments both the average level of ability and its variability will 
be highly correlated over-time. This means that in less selective environments the lagged 
performance will be more correlated with the current VA (the SFE), resulting in a lower AR(1) 
coefficient in econometric specifications controlling for SFEs. This is consistent with the evidence 
of a lower AR(1) coefficient in Trento than in Valle d’Aosta, i.e., the second empirical fact that we 
observed. 
The same argument could also explain why in the case of Trento we do not find any statistically 
significant association between family background characteristics and student performance after 
controlling for SFEs (see column (5) in Table 9), while some student characteristics turn out to 
significantly affect performance in the case of Valle d’Aosta. Let us assume that the reason for the 
high selectivity of the school system in Valle d’Aosta is that students are initially more mismatched 
to schools, e.g., they chose a school which is not aligned with their level of ability. This may stem, 
for instance, from better school orientation in Trento than in Valle d’Aosta. Students who are better 
matched with the same school will have similar family background characteristics (homogeneous 
school intake), which will be captured by the SFEs.  In schools where students are more mismatched 
and have more heterogeneous background characteristics, the SFE will not be a good proxy of each 
individual’s characteristics, some of which may turn to be significantly associated with school 
performance. 
                                                 
32 An additional justification for the inclusion of the variance among peers with anegative effect can be obtained by 
the existence of strong complementarities in individual abilities in the EPF (Benabou 1996a and 1996b). In the 
limiting case where the elasticity of substitution goes to zero, the educational production function takes the form 
    iiiiijt aaanaT    ,min1 1  and the individual performance happens to be constrained by the 
lowest of peers’ ability. 
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Indeed, in the case of Trento we observe that individual past performance captures almost all 
relevant information at the individual level (see columns (5) or (7) in Table 9), SFEs are highly 
correlated across years (rank correlation of cross-sectional estimates is 0.88 – see bottom line of the 
correlation matrix associated to Table 9) and the gain in explained variance when SFEs are 
introduced is limited (the R² changes from 0.29 to 0.52 in 2009 survey and from 0.18 to 0.47 in 2010 
survey – see again columns (1) to (4) in table 9).  
A quite different situation is recorded in the Valle d’Aosta’s experiment. In this case including past 
performance does not preclude statistical significance of other individual characteristics (see column 
(5) in Table 10 – these effects are attenuated when we account for potential self-selection into the 
sample, as done in column (7) of the same table). SFEs are less correlated across survey years 
(correlation is null or even negative), and the explained variance improves significantly: the R² 
changes from 0.34 to 0.62 in 2009 survey and from 0.38 to 0.62 in 2010 survey – see columns (1) to 
(4) in Table 10).  
In principle we can estimate an AR(1) coefficient for the panel component of students even in each 
school, despite the limited degrees of freedom. By restricting the number of regressors to gender, 
age, grade attended and a proxy for family background (number of books available), we have 
estimated an AR(1) coefficient by school, and plotted it against a measure of school (social) 
heterogeneity (namely the standard deviation of the prestige associated to parental occupations). 
These scatter-plots are shown in figures 4 and 5, which suggest a greater variation for the AR(1) 
estimates in the case of Trento (Figure 4) compared to the case of Valle d’Aosta (Figure 5). 
Nevertheless in both experiments we find a weak but positive correlation between social 
heterogeneity and persistence in individual test scores: when the social environment is 
homogeneous, past performance in learning has a lower correlation with current performance, while 
on the contrary it increases in more heterogeneous environments. 
This interpretation finds additional support in Table 12, where we have highlighted the differences 
between cross-sectional and longitudinal estimates of gradients of  individual family backgrounds 
and school tracks. In the table we have shown only some coefficients, but the estimated models are 
fully equivalent to those presented in tables 9 and 10 (except the fact that SFEs are replaced by track 
fixed effects). In columns (1)-(2)-(3) we present  results referring to the panel component of the 
Trento experiment: the first two columns refer to cross-sectional estimates, while the third one 
exploits the longitudinal dimension by including past performance as an additional regressor. 
Columns (4)-(5)-(6) replicates the same exercise for Valle d’Aosta; in order to account for possible 
distortions induced by different test languages, columns (7) and (8) restrict the analysis to the 
subsample of students who took the test in Italian. We notice that the introduction of past test 
performance as an additional regressor generally reduces the correlation between a student’s 
competences and her relevant characteristics, but this reduction is more pronounced in the case of 
Valle d’Aosta.  
We are obviously unable with our data to ascertain whether curricular differences, teaching quality 
and/or contextual effects (e.g., peer groups) drive these effects, as well as whether there is any role 
for individual effort. More detailed information would be needed to discriminate among alternative 
explanations.  
 
8  Concluding remarks 
What can be learned from the two PISA re-test “experiments” described in this paper? First of all we 
have shown that cross-sectional measures of school value added (i.e. those obtained by EPFs not 
controlling for past test scores) face remarkable problems of non-random attrition. In educational 
settings characterized by high student attrition, this will lead to very volatile measures of VA which 
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are difficult to interpret by both the public and policy makers. In the case of Valle d’Aosta, for 
instance, we have shown that the correlation between school VA in 2009 and 2010 is close to zero. 
We have contrasted the cross-sectional measures with longitudinal measures of school VA. Here 
there are two main things to notice. First, in settings characterized by low student attrition (drop-out 
or school changes), longitudinal and cross-sectional measures of school VA turn out to be very 
correlated. By contrast, the correlation between the two measures is much lower when student 
attrition is high, and the correlation tends to change from year to year. Second, notwithstanding the 
problem of potential non-random student attrition, we show that longitudinal models of school VA, 
controlling for past test scores, are less sensitive to sample selection. This holds true in both high 
and low attrition settings. This points to the importance of testing the same cohort of students over 
time to build robust measures of school VA. 
Another interesting finding of our analysis is that the persistence in test scores (the first order 
autoregressive coefficient) estimated in longitudinal models of school VA is higher in high attrition 
educational settings. In the paper we propose a rationalization of all these pieces of evidence 
grounded on a very simple framework in which an individual’s knowledge depends on her past 
performance, her own ability and the abilities of her peer group, along with the variance of these 
abilities. We show that more selective educational systems (or schools) will generate the empirical 
facts found in our paper. Intuitively, more selective systems, i.e. systems in which there are a high 
number of drop outs or school changers, may be those in which individuals were initially 
mismatched with respect to the schools they enrolled in. This will reflect in higher heterogeneity in 
the school intake in the initial grades of a school cycle. If this is the case, the school fixed effect will 
be a worse proxy of (i.e., less correlated with) the individual’s characteristics, such past test 
performance, inducing a higher persistence in test cores (a higher first autoregressive coefficient). 
Moreover, a higher school mismatch also entails a peer group which changes overtime both in 
average ability and in the variance of the peer group. As peer group’s effects enter the estimate of 
school VA (school fixed effects) this also implies a higher variability in cross-sectional measures of 
school VA overtime in more selective schooling environments. 
A main limitation of our study is that although the two “experiments” implemented in the Trento 
and Valle d’Aosta regions and described in this paper represent a first attempt to investigate the 
evolution overtime  of “knowledge for life”, they remain nonetheless two case studies and only 
allow us to compute yearly measures of school VA. It would be interesting then to extend these re-
tests to other regions in order to assess whether the empirical facts found in this paper also extend to 
other areas of Italy, and to long-term measures of VA, on which the influence of differential 
selectivity of school systems (or schools) should be even more severe. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics, by macro-regions and type of school attended - Italy PISA 2009 
 
Literacy (mean, standard deviation and number of observations)  
macroregion high  school 
technical 
school 
state 
vocational  
regional 
vocational  Total 
Trento 563.69 510.60 472.73 414.57 507.5 
 62.69 61.77 70.35 71.98 86.49 
 575 425 136 311 1447 
Valle d'Aosta 560.37 513.58 464.01 424.71 517.11 
 65.33 61.37 71.78 55.63 81.34 
 432 121 283 35 871 
Rest of North East 562.38 508.98 459.41 414.16 507.27 
 63.38 62.61 78.08 75.55 85.97 
 2019 1558 947 737 5261 
Rest of North West 562.28 503.58 435.11 401.96 512.36 
 64.35 67.95 82.89 73.58 88.19 
 2031 1343 824 235 4433 
Centre and South 532.80 457.98 399.31 365.60 480.19 
 66.70 72.69 75.35 67.55 88.85 
 8819 5934 3796 219 18768 
Italy 543.56 476.08 418.47 405.70 491.78 
 67.19 73.77 81.02 74.91 89.16 
 13876 9381 5986 1537 30780 
 
Numeracy (mean, standard deviation and number of observations)  
macroregion high  school 
technical 
school 
state 
vocational  
regional 
vocational  Total 
Trento 549.36 534.21 475.66 443.81 515.3 
 71.03 60.46 72.29 63.30 78.96 
 575 425 136 311 1447 
Valle d'Aosta 533.45 531.49 462.04 409.9 505.01 
 77.59 66.75 68.47 49.66 81.71 
 432 121 283 35 871 
Rest of North East 552.99 529.96 464.09 445.45 515.10 
 68.99 64.83 70.53 70.02 80.10 
 2019 1558 947 737 5261 
Rest of North West 546.68 511.93 438.01 412.36 508.83 
 71.07 65.34 74.46 72.00 83.63 
 2031 1343 824 235 4433 
Centre and South 511.04 473.18 407.06 382.87 476.54 
 75.04 74.77 71.35 63.56 84.44 
 8819 5934 3796 219 18768 
Italy 524.65 491.67 424.50 430.33 490.41 
 75.75 75.42 75.55 71.43 85.08 
 13876 9381 5986 1537 30780 
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Table 2 - Variance explained by school types - Italy PISA 2009 
 
 reading numeracy 
 
variance 
explained by 
school track 
fixed effect  (R²) 
variance 
explained by 
school fixed 
effect (R²) 
variance 
explained by 
school track 
fixed effect (R²) 
variance 
explained by 
school fixed 
effect (R²) 
Trento 0.43 0.55 0.29 0.49 
Valle d'Aosta 0.33 0.50 0.22 0.48 
Rest of North East 0.38 0.54 0.27 0.50 
Rest of North West 0.37 0.57 0.30 0.51 
Centre and South 0.37 0.57 0.23 0.52 
Italy 0.34 0.58 0.21 0.54 
 
 
Table 3 - Family background alternative measures: means of highest occupational prestige, highest years 
of parental education and ESCS (PISA index of economic, social and cultural status) – Italy PISA 2009 
 
macroregion high school 
technical 
school 
state 
vocational 
regional 
vocational Total 
Trento 51.10 43.83 44.30 37.12 45.39 
 13.99 13.01 13.64 12.28 13.31 
 0.20 -0.22 -0.12 -0.61 -0.13 
Valle d'Aosta 52.95 45.02 41.94 40.66 47.81 
 13.86 12.7 12.23 11.2 13.07 
 0.21 -0.23 -0.46 -0.73 -0.11 
Rest of North East 53.92 45.25 43.33 38.42 47.33 
 14.14 12.71 12.51 12.23 13.16 
 0.33 -0.22 -0.36 -0.59 -0.08 
Rest of North West 55.96 45.42 41.96 36.42 49.18 
 14.39 12.88 12.42 11.58 13.42 
 0.43 -0.18 -0.47 -0.79 0.01 
Centre and South 52.55 42.66 38.65 35.77 46.48 
 13.86 12.32 11.72 11.29 12.92 
 0.28 -0.34 -0.65 -0.87 -0.12 
Italy 53.20 43.58 40.15 37.53 47.00 
 13.98 12.5 12.01 11.98 13.05 
 0.30 -0.29 -0.56 -0.67 -0.09 
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Table 4 - Scheme for booklet distribution in the PISA 2010 re-test 
 
Bookid Pisa 2009 Bookid Re-test 2010 
1 M1 R1 R3 M3 7 R6 M3 S3 R4 
2 R1 S1 R4 R7 3 S1 R3 M2 S3 
3 S1 R3 M2 S3 5 R4 M2 R5 M1 
4 R3 R4 S2 R2 9 M2 S2 R6 R1 
5 R4 M2 R5 M1 11 M3 R7 R2 M2 
6 R5 R6 R7 R3 13 S3 R2 R1 R5 
7 R6 M3 S3 R4 1 M1 R1 R3 M3 
8 R2 M1 S1 R6 2 R1 S1 R4 R7 
9 M2 S2 R6 R1 4 R3 R4 S2 R2 
10 S2 R5 M3 S1 8 R2 M1 S1 R6 
11 M3 R7 R2 M2 10 S2 R5 M3 S1 
12 R7 S3 M1 S2 6 R5 R6 R7 R3 
13 S3 R2 R1 R5 12 R7 S3 M1 S2 
Notes. Grey cells correspond to the common sections in both 2009 and 2010 tests. Each booklet section is identified by a letter 
indicating the typology (M for maths, S for sciences and R for reading) and a numeric value.   
 
 
Table 5 - Participation to re-test in 2010 –Aosta 
 
 
 school attended in 2010 
 
 school attended in 2009 
high 
schools 
technical 
school 
state 
vocational 
school 
regional 
vocational 
school 
out of 
schooling / 
absent / not 
matched 
Total %  drop-out 
%drop-
out+mobility 
to different 
schools 
high schools 352 2 24 3 51 432 0.118 0.185 
technical school 0 100 5 0 16 121 0.132 0.174 
state vocational school 1 0 222 3 57 283 0.201 0.216 
regional vocational school 0 0 0 22 13 35 0.371 0.371 
lower secondary 0 0 2 0 6 8 0.750 1.000 
Total 353 102 253 28 143 879 0.163 0.208 
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Table 6 – Potential sample distortions – Trento 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
TN 2009 all 
available 
obs no SFE 
TN 
selection 
equation to 
PISA 2010 
by school 
TN selection 
equation to 
PISA 2010 
within 
participating 
schools 
TN 2009 
panel 
component 
no SFE 
TN 2010 
panel 
component 
no SFE 
TN 2010 
panel 
component 
no SFE 
corrected 
with pr.test 
TN 2010 
participating 
school no 
SFE 
Heckman 
selection 
equation 
female 0.996 -0.308 0.033 -12.204 -14.105 -14.463 -13.263 0.098 
 [6.674] [1.020] [0.110] [6.846]* [7.511]* [7.539]* [8.457] [0.114] 
age of student 7.51 -1.048 -0.294 11.455 8.628 16.781 15.3 -0.23 
 [6.031] [2.772] [0.170]* [8.572] [11.117] [13.136] [12.652] [0.149] 
grade compared to modal grade 
in country 
44.482 -0.907 0.294 41.174 24.686 14.008 13.108 0.101 
[9.331]*** [1.283] [0.169]* [13.587]*** [9.573]** [13.021] [10.251] [0.177] 
attended kindergarten 37.554 11.93 0.15 25.593 17.143 11.915 10.649 0.07 
 [10.210]*** [3.806]*** [0.249] [15.107]* [14.811] [16.660] [18.741] [0.248] 
single parent 10.123  -0.341 9.997 0.899 13.088 12.085 -0.32 
 [6.258]  [0.159]** [9.554] [10.791] [13.744] [9.864] [0.148]** 
how many books at home 11.027 1.759 0.063 11.631 7.795 5.16 5.504 0.017 
 [1.528]*** [0.900]* [0.042] [2.186]*** [2.283]*** [3.280] [2.713]** [0.043] 
highest parental education years -1.449 -0.076 -0.038 -1.748 -1.441 -0.13 -0.238 -0.021 
 [0.793]* [0.417] [0.021]* [1.158] [1.073] [1.579] [1.001] [0.020] 
highest parental occupational 
status 
0.477 0.01 0 0.423 0.128 0.125 0.161 0.002 
[0.145]*** [0.075] [0.005] [0.202]** [0.356] [0.352] [0.299] [0.003] 
wealth -6.071  -0.047 -4.28 -5.693 -3.846 -4.166 -0.06 
 [3.391]*  [0.092] [4.620] [5.418] [5.285] [4.672] [0.078] 
second-generation immigrants -4.694  -0.313 -4.905 -4.619 8.998 4.556 -0.392 
 [12.599]  [0.357] [16.583] [26.031] [23.287] [26.545] [0.306] 
first-generation immigrants -28.147  0.031 -42.234 -36.927 -33.658 -36.996 0.018 
 [10.698]**  [0.255] [16.584]** [13.280]*** [12.258]*** [15.751]** [0.265] 
high school (licei) 109.527 1.164 0.292 116.732 135.415 121.684 120.156 -0.114 
 [11.405]*** [1.335] [0.159]* [15.760]*** [14.409]*** [18.457]*** [14.819]*** [0.166] 
technical schools (Istituti tecnici) 73.454 1.554 0.092 70.691 82.227 76.96 76.417 -0.115 
 [9.962]*** [1.081] [0.121] [14.461]*** [13.103]*** [14.640]*** [12.343]*** [0.125] 
state vocational schools (Istituti 
professionali statali) 
38.915 -0.083 -0.01 32.509 62.738 61.345 58.832 -0.199 
[14.234]*** [0.860] [0.106] [18.399]* [18.977]*** [19.185]*** [18.063]*** [0.109]* 
test score 2009 (reading)  -0.026 0.001     0.003 
  [0.012]** [0.001]**     [0.001]*** 
day of 2010 testing=Monday   0.079     -0.08 
   [0.108]     [0.151] 
day of 2010 testing =Tuesday   0.136     -0.13 
   [0.100]     [0.095] 
day of 2010 testing =Wednesday   -0.359     -0.23 
   [0.151]**     [0.169] 
day of 2010 testing =Friday   -0.089     -0.258 
   [0.111]     [0.109]** 
day of 2010 testing =Saturday   -0.407     -0.303 
   [0.106]***     [0.119]** 
Probability of attending test in 
2010 (from col.3) 
     135.285   
     [97.255]   
                  -0.886*** 
        [0.046] 
Observations 1359 49 941 753 753 753 941 941 
R² 0.45 0.21 0.06 0.45 0.38 0.38 - - 
Pseudo R² - Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at school level - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Weight=student weights –  column 2: probit model estimated using school averages – column 3: probit model, conditional on their schools having 
accepted to participate – columns 1, 4, 5, 6: OLS – columns 7-8: MLE Heckman selection model (   is the correlation coefficient between the errors 
in the EPF and the selection equations) 
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Table 7 – Potential sample distortions – Valle d’Aosta 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
AO 2009 all 
available obs 
no SFE 
AO selection 
equation to 
PISA 2010 
no SFE 
AO selection 
equation to 
panel 
component 
of PISA 
2010 no 
SFE  
AO 2009 
panel 
component 
no SFE 
AO 2010 
panel 
component 
no SFE 
AO 2010 
panel 
component 
no SFE 
corrected 
with pr.test 
AO 2010 
participating 
schools no 
SFE 
Heckman 
selection 
equation 
female 7.564 0.083 0.135 5.11 15.494 -8.616 11.486 0.016 
 [5.683] [0.108] [0.075]* [5.463] [5.953]** [5.187] [5.556]** [0.083] 
age of student 5.877 -0.492 -0.206 13.222 7.214 32.789 9.596 -0.227 
 [5.021] [0.229]** [0.223] [7.275]* [11.093] [9.086]*** [13.624] [0.202] 
grade compared to modal 
grade in country 
55.232 0.305 0.553 48.998 50.21 -90.018 29.297 0.2 
[5.535]*** [0.200] [0.088]*** [5.569]*** [7.782]*** [8.062]*** [6.826]*** [0.104]* 
attended kindergarten 14.877 0.605 0.807 37.03 40.114 -165.589 3.443 0.724 
 [12.775] [0.345]* [0.348]** [21.181]* [18.912]** [21.660]*** [28.116] [0.349]** 
single parent -4.879 -0.269 -0.256 -9.612 -14.163 38.141 -4.698 -0.222 
 [6.035] [0.212] [0.185] [6.701] [8.258] [6.407]*** [8.005] [0.182] 
how many books at home 12.657 0.01 -0.022 12.505 13.301 9.696 12.592 -0.092 
 [2.250]*** [0.033] [0.035] [2.296]*** [2.042]*** [1.520]*** [2.129]*** [0.037]** 
highest parental education in 
years 
-0.76 0.03 0.027 -0.348 1.739 -2.83 0.792 0.023 
[0.703] [0.021] [0.022] [0.781] [1.017] [0.782]*** [1.019] [0.018] 
highest parental occupational 
status 
0.147 -0.01 -0.004 0.228 -0.036 0.532 0.023 -0.005 
[0.157] [0.003]*** [0.003] [0.184] [0.246] [0.157]*** [0.219] [0.003]* 
wealth -10.515 -0.068 0.003 -10.256 -7.333 -1.917 -6.912 0.052 
 [3.749]** [0.132] [0.077] [4.200]** [3.562]* [2.570] [4.124]* [0.080] 
second-generation immigrants -24.055 -0.164 0.276 -23.561 42.457 1.367 34.524 0.377 
 [43.177] [0.524] [0.527] [50.152] [32.084] [20.473] [31.948] [0.538] 
first-generation immigrants -41.803 0.065 0.461 -36.569 -52.038 -110.779 -61.488 0.727 
 [10.609]*** [0.229] [0.238]* [14.776]** [13.608]*** [13.945]*** [15.677]*** [0.220]*** 
high school (Licei) 100.557 0.56 -0.159 117.687 197.632 139.945 175.148 -1.001 
 [15.475]*** [0.198]*** [0.210] [13.330]*** [23.276]*** [24.458]*** [28.712]*** [0.391]** 
technical schools (Istituti 
tecnici) 
72.677 0.65 0.211 89.419 157.319 57.282 127.879 -0.54 
[12.431]*** [0.220]*** [0.292] [12.610]*** [22.073]*** [25.388]** [28.444]*** [0.446] 
state vocational schools (Istituti 
professionali statali) 
25.837 0.696 0.314 44.975 119.683 31.605 92.144 -0.139 
[15.225] [0.174]*** [0.186]* [16.281]** [23.687]*** [24.836] [29.357]*** [0.393] 
test score in 2009 (reading)  0.003 0.004     0.009 
  [0.001]** [0.001]***     [0.001]*** 
test conducted in French     -61.009 -60.444 -59.434  
     [4.824]*** [3.845]*** [4.182]***  
Probability of attending test in 
2010 (from col.3) 
     673.1   
     [37.262]***   
                  -0.885*** 
        [0.033] 
Observations 839 839 839 663 663 663 839 839 
R² 0.53 0.10 0.11 0.52 0.57 0.70   
Pseudo R² - Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at school level - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Weight=student weights. Column 2: probit model for participating to PISA 2010 – column 3: probit model for participating to PISA 2010, conditional 
on remaining in the same school – columns 1, 4, 5, 6: OLS – columns 7-8: MLE Heckman selection model (   is the correlation coefficient between 
the errors in the EPF and the selection equations) 
 
 
Table 8 – Sample means of reading test scores –students remaining in the same schools – Valle d’Aosta 
 
 test in Italian test in French 
 2009 test 2010 test 2009 test 2010 test 
high school (Licei) 568.14 576.69 569.44 525.78 
technical schools (Istituti tecnici) 519.74 526.29 525.04 450.81 
state vocational schools (Istituti 
professionali statali) 474.70 479.73 474.97 416.74 
regional vocational schools (Centri 
formazione professionale regionali) 429.15 367.77 430.16 293.20 
Total 527.34 532.35 529.20 473.58 
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Table 9 – Alternative strategies to identify school fixed effects (intercepts only) - Trento  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
TN 2009 
panel 
component no 
SFE 
TN 2009 
panel 
component 
SFE 
TN 2010 
panel 
component no 
SFE 
TN 2010 
panel 
component 
SFE 
TN 2009-10 
panel 
component 
SFE 
TN 2009-10 
panel 
component 
SFE 
TN 0910 
panel 
component 
SFE with PS 
        
test score in 2009 (reading)     0.257*** 0.295*** 0.304*** 
     [0.054] [0.055] [0.070] 
female 4.921 -4.277 5.885 -3.647 -2.547  -1.277 
 [7.401] [7.570] [7.953] [7.090] [5.944]  [5.935] 
age of student 22.093** 14.365** 20.118* 4.784 1.089  -10.85 
 [9.676] [6.524] [11.155] [9.230] [8.452]  [14.580] 
grade compared to modal grade in 
country 
52.383** 40.467*** 35.144** 15.597* 5.186  18.718 
[19.996] [11.325] [14.690] [9.076] [8.883]  [12.913] 
attended kindergarten 30.921* 20.279 23.722* 14.406 9.189  15.087 
 [16.674] [15.078] [13.080] [13.957] [13.307]  [13.874] 
single parent 8.244 12.706 -1.239 3.4 0.131  -15.23 
 [9.751] [9.111] [11.480] [11.915] [11.572]  [15.678] 
how many books at home 18.405*** 8.397*** 15.118*** 3.973* 1.812  4.341 
 [2.944] [1.885] [2.403] [2.277] [2.231]  [3.720] 
highest parental education in years -0.99 -2.183* -0.485 -2.039* -1.477  -3.046 
 [1.157] [1.188] [1.072] [1.040] [0.969]  [1.896] 
highest parental occupational status 1.086*** 0.334* 0.858* -0.108 -0.194  -0.21 
 [0.257] [0.195] [0.451] [0.381] [0.366]  [0.364] 
wealth -5.612 -3.898 -7.198 -5.267 -4.265  -6.101 
 [4.668] [5.180] [6.123] [4.694] [5.152]  [4.898] 
second-generation immigrants -10.144 1.262 -9.594 6.928 6.604  -8.415 
 [14.291] [14.232] [24.709] [29.179] [28.190]  [28.485] 
first-generation immigrants -41.721* -41.763*** -38.894* -39.041*** -28.296**  -28.605** 
 [22.370] [14.770] [19.946] [11.117] [10.725]  [10.697] 
Propensity score (PS)       -159.94 
       [146.637] 
Observations 753 753 753 753 753 753 753 
R² 0.289 0.523 0.182 0.472 0.503 0.492 0.503 
Number of schools 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
School FE NO YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at school level - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Weight=student weights 
 
 
Correlation among school fixed effects 
Model (2) (4) (5) (7) student FE 
SFE 2009 (2) 1.000     
SFE 2010 (4) 0.918 1.000    
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 (5) 0.865 0.993 1.000   
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 with PS (7) 0.876 0.987 0.989 1.000  
for comparison: 
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 with student FE  -0.263 0.117 0.225 0.179 1.000 
 
Rank correlation among school fixed effects 
Model (2) (4) (5) (7) student FE 
SFE 2009 (2) 1.000     
SFE 2010 (4) 0.887 1.000    
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 (5) 0.809 0.975 1.000   
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 with PS (7) 0.818 0.963 0.974 1.000  
for comparison: 
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 with student FE  -0.347 0.020 0.162 0.116 1.000 
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Table 10 – Alternative strategies to identify school fixed effects (intercepts only) – Valle d’Aosta  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
AO 2009 
panel 
component no 
SFE 
AO 2009 
panel 
component 
SFE 
AO 2010 
panel 
component no 
SFE 
AO 2010 
panel 
component 
SFE 
AO 0910 
panel 
component 
SFE 
AO 0910 
panel 
component 
SFE 
AO 0910 
panel 
component 
SFE with PS 
        
test score in 2009 (reading)     0.688*** 0.778*** 0.629*** 
     [0.036] [0.033] [0.100] 
female 9.012 9.627** 19.890*** 22.483*** 15.866**  13.731* 
 [6.367] [4.621] [6.457] [6.106] [5.772]  [6.886] 
age of student 22.560*** 10.341 20.753** 5.979 -1.135  2.2 
 [7.006] [7.120] [9.532] [9.671] [8.023]  [8.235] 
grade compared to modal grade in 
country 
62.584*** 36.364*** 67.029*** 40.027*** 15.015**  4.007 
[8.682] [4.931] [11.685] [7.176] [5.775]  [17.298] 
attended kindergarten 60.945** 32.750* 68.407*** 33.681* 11.18  -6.884 
 [22.830] [17.535] [20.202] [18.998] [18.931]  [28.633] 
single parent -8.442 -2.893 -11.151 -8.323 -6.313  -6.306 
 [8.908] [5.760] [10.574] [7.564] [4.896]  [4.858] 
how many books at home 13.821*** 10.260*** 14.724*** 10.914*** 3.853**  4.302** 
 [2.639] [2.251] [2.714] [1.880] [1.662]  [1.950] 
Highest parental education in years 0.958 -0.493 3.334** 1.697* 2.035**  1.489 
 [1.018] [0.762] [1.285] [0.959] [0.748]  [1.249] 
highest parental occupational status 0.679** -0.011 0.49 -0.209 -0.201  -0.115 
 [0.292] [0.193] [0.363] [0.258] [0.166]  [0.203] 
wealth -9.531 -3.34 -6.223 -1.412 0.889  0.872 
 [6.044] [2.438] [5.871] [2.462] [2.617]  [2.638] 
second-generation immigrants 5.573 -9.68 75.713** 55.108** 61.662***  60.760*** 
 [45.060] [36.019] [31.018] [23.113] [21.253]  [21.283] 
first-generation immigrants -32.731** -38.683*** -46.851** -51.842*** -25.236**  -24.708* 
 [15.600] [13.423] [16.580] [12.393] [11.833]  [12.028] 
test conducted in French   -60.519*** -62.690*** -62.483*** -61.604*** -62.352*** 
   [5.939] [4.874] [3.763] [3.501] [3.731] 
Propensity score (PS)       70.012 
       [101.390] 
Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 
R² 0.345 0.62 0.38 0.625 0.741 0.721 0.741 
Number of schools 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
School FE NO YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at school level - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Weight=student weights 
 
 
Correlation among school fixed effects 
Model (2) (4) (5) (7) student FE 
SFE 2009 (2) 1     
SFE 2010 (4) -0.0192 1    
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 (5) 0.189 0.8494 1   
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 with PS (7) 0.1862 0.8558 0.9962 1  
for comparison: 
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 with student FE  0.3086 0.5808 0.9171 0.9101 1 
 
Rank correlation among school fixed effects 
Model (2) (4) (5) (7) student FE 
SFE 2009 (2) 1     
SFE 2010 (4) -0.1338 1    
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 (5) 0.1022 0.7222 1   
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 with PS (7) 0.0864 0.773 0.9898 1  
for comparison: 
longitudinal SFE 2009-2010 with student FE 0.3461 0.2332 0.7538 0.7154 1 
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Table 11 – Main differences between Trento and Valle d’Aosta PISA 2010 re-tests 
 
Empirical “facts” Trento Valle d’Aosta 
Correlation between 2009 and 2010 cross-
sectional school VAs High Low 
Coefficient on lagged performance in the 
longitudinal model of school VA Low High 
 
 
Table 12 – Alternative measures of family background and school type gradients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Trento Valle d’Aosta Valle d’Aosta (only Italian) 
 
TN 2009 
panel 
component 
cross-sect 
TN 2010 
panel 
component 
cross-sect 
TN 2010 
panel 
component 
longitudinal 
 coeff 
AO 2009 
panel 
component 
cross-sect 
AO 2010 
panel 
component 
cross-sect 
AO 2010 
panel 
component 
longitudinal 
 coeff 
AO 2010 
panel 
component 
no French 
cross-sect 
AO 2010 
panel 
component 
no French 
longitudinal 
 coeff 
test score in 2009 (reading)   0.348    0.702   0.649  
   [0.049]**    [0.033]**   [0.035]**  
grade attended( compared to modal 
grade) 
41.174 24.686 10.362 -58.0% 48.998 50.21 15.788 -68.6% 50.895 15.711 -69.1% 
[13.587]** [9.573]* [7.668]  [5.569]** [7.782]** [5.721]*  [7.149]** [7.052]*  
how many books at home 11.631 7.795 3.749 -51.9% 12.505 13.301 4.533 -65.9% 14.691 5.197 -64.6% 
 [2.186]** [2.283]** [2.199]  [2.296]** [2.042]** [1.752]*  [3.022]** [2.584]  
highest parental education in years -1.748 -1.441 -0.832 -42.3% -0.348 1.739 1.987 14.3% 2.932 3.261 11.2% 
 [1.158] [1.073] [0.977]  [0.781] [1.017] [0.758]*  [0.903]** [0.560]**  
first-generation immigrants -42.234 -36.927 -22.234 -39.8% -36.569 -52.038 -26.342 -49.4% -34.888 -29.192 -16.3% 
 [16.584]* [13.280]** [10.901]*  [14.776]* [13.608]** [12.438]*  [17.775] [17.527]  
high school (Licei) 116.732 135.415 94.806 -30.0% 117.687 197.632 114.962 -41.8% 189.965 107.8 -43.3% 
 [15.760]** [14.409]** [14.382]**  [13.330]** [23.276]** [22.931]**  [29.399]** [28.728]**  
technical schools (Istituti tecnici) 70.691 82.227 57.635 -29.9% 89.419 157.319 94.511 -39.9% 166.583 107.145 -35.7% 
 [14.461]** [13.103]** [10.774]**  [12.610]** [22.073]** [23.435]**  [29.329]** [28.712]**  
state vocational schools (Istituti 
professionali statali) 
32.509 62.738 51.429 -18.0% 44.975 119.683 88.084 -26.4% 118.577 85.512 -27.9% 
[18.399] [18.977]** [13.832]**  [16.281]* [23.687]** [22.754]**  [30.813]** [28.023]**  
French      -61.009 -61.74     
      [4.824]** [3.764]**     
Observations 753 753 753  663 663 663  328 328  
R² 0.45 0.38 0.45  0.52 0.57 0.72  0.53 0.69  
School FE NO NO NO  NO NO NO  NO NO  
robust standard errors in brackets clustered at school level - weight=student weights - * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
regressors include gender, age, kindergarten attended, single parent, parental occupation, proxy for family wealth, second 
generation immigrants 
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Figure 1 – Location of the relevant provinces 
Valle d'Aosta (left) and Trento (right)
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Figure 2 – School effectiveness - Trento 
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Figure 3 – School effectiveness – Aosta 
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Figure 4 – Social homogeneity and persistence - Trento 
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Figure 5 – Social homogeneity and persistence – Valle d’Aosta 
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